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PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES:
EXCLUDED DAMAGES OR INTEREST INCOME
JAMES C. HASENFUS*
Section 104 (a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from
gross income the amount of damages received because of personal
injuries.' This is an exception to the general rule set forth in § 61 (a),
that gross income includes all income from whatever source derived. 2 In
a personal injury action, a plaintiff may either recover an amount of
money which is specifically separated into distinct parts, or simply
receive an agreed upon sum of money which is not allocated among the
various elements it represents. If an element of the award were labeled as
interest, it would appear to be specifically included in gross income.3 A
lump sum amount received as a result of a personal injury may include
an unstated interest element that is effectively excluded from gross
income. If interest is allocated as part of an award, an issue is raised as to
whether it is included in gross income as interest, or whether it is exclud-
ed as damages received on account of personal injuries.
A personal injury claim disputed by the defendant requiring the
case to go to trial may undergo various procedures before the successful
plaintiff ultimately collects money. A trial court award appealed and
upheld may have interest added to and included in the amount eventual-
ly collected. If a jury verdict is questioned and appealed, but the matter
is settled before the appeal is decided and the settlement amount is
different from the amount originally calculated, a tax question may
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern New England School of Law, North Dartmouth, Massa-
chusetts. B.A., 1975, Rhode Island College; J.D., 1980, University of Bridgeport School of Law;
LL.M., 1983, Boston University School of Law. The author would like to thank his colleagues Howard
Senzel, Frances Howell Rudko, and Dwight G. Duncan for their assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. I.R.C. § 104 (a) (1994 & West Supp. 1998). The current version reads in relevant part:
COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR SICKNESS
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess
of) deductions allowed under Section 213 . . . for any prior taxable year, gross income
does not include-...
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by
suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of
personal physical injuries or physical sickness;...
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury
or physical sickness. The preceding sentence shall not apply to an amount of damages
not in excess of the amount paid for medical care (described in subparagraph (A) or (B)
of Section 213 (d)(1)) attributable to emotional distress.
2. References are to the current version of the Internal Revenue Code. References within cases
discussed are to the applicable version of the Code in effect at the time in question.
3. I.R.C. § 61 (a)(4) (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
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arise. The question remains whether part of the settlement collected
constitutes interest included in gross income by § 61 (a)(4), or whether
the entire settlement constitutes damages received on account of personal
injuries excluded by § 104 (a)(2). However, the conflict examined here
does not concern postjudgment interest, the interest earned for the time
which elapses after the point when a fixed amount is unquestionably
due. Rather, the issue addressed is whether part of an amount collected
through judgement or settlement is interest included in gross income or
damages excluded from gross income. 4
I. MCSHANE V. COMMISSIONER-AN INTEREST ELEMENT
EXCLUDED?
An example of exclusion is the Tax Court's decision in McShane v.
Commissioner.5 In McShane, the plaintiffs were injured in a gas explo-
sion and fire and filed suit to recover for their personal injuries. After
trial, jury verdicts were returned in favor of the plaintiffs. Under Massa-
chusetts law, the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the verdict from the
date the suit was filed until the final judgment was satisfied. Defendants
appealed and commenced settlement negotiations. The negotiations
resulted in an agreement under which plaintiffs were to receive lump
sums larger than the amount of the jury verdicts. 6 In addressing the
amount to be paid the court pointed out that:
The agreements provided that the lump sums were to be paid
for the personal injuries received by petitioners; and at the
insistence of Boston Gas all of the settlement agreements
provided that the lump sums were to be paid 'without costs and
interest.' During the negotiations the tax consequences of the
settlement without interest were never discussed or considered.
The amounts were arrived at by each of the parties taking into
consideration their risk or 'exposure' by a continuance of the
appeal. The total of the settlements was equal to the total of the
verdicts in the lower court plus statutory interest to an arbitrari-
ly chosen date less a 5 percent discount. Counsel for each of
the parties agreed that this was a reasonable basis for the
settlement of petitioners' claims for personal injuries and each
4. The cases examined here deal with prejudgment interest although the facts and arguments pre-
sented to and discussed by the courts do not always clearly separate the interest into its two component
time periods. The focus of this article is the prejudgment interest question.
5. 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 409 (1987).
6. McShane v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 409,410 (1987).
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of them recommended the acceptance of the settlements to
their respective clients.7
The settlement was paid and plaintiffs did not include any part of it
in their gross income. The Commissioner determined that a deficiency
existed, and argued that part of the settlement was includable interest
income. 8
The court concluded that the entire settlement amount was damages
received on account of personal injuries excluded by § 104 (a)(2) and
no part was includable under § 61.9 It noted that although statutory
interest would be paid on a final judgement, the jury verdicts were
appealed and settled prior to a final determination. The court then went
on to review the settlement agreement to determine if any of the pay-
ment received was interest. It noted that the agreement provided that the
settlement was to be paid 'without costs and interest,' but that statement
alone is not controlling.10 The court pointed out that parties and attor-
neys "all uniformly testified in an honest and forthright manner that the
tax consequences of the settlements were never considered in the negoti-
ations, but instead the settlement amounts were arrived at solely from a
consideration by each party of the risks it would be subjected to by
continuing the appeal."ll Although the amount of the jury verdicts
were considered in the negotiations, they were not treated as an amount
due to which interest would be added but "were considered only for the
purpose of calculating the dollar exposure around which negotiations
were centered ... ."12 Thus in McShane, the entire amount received by
plaintiffs was determined to be damages received on account of personal
injuries and no part of the award was considered to be included in gross
income as interest. The court did not decide the issue of whether part of
the amount received represented the time value of money.
II. KOVACS V. COMMISSIONER-INTEREST NOT AN ELEMENT
OF DAMAGES
In Kovacs v. Commissioner, the Tax Court was directly presented
with the question of whether interest received as part of an amount
collected as a result of a personal injury action was excluded from gross
income under § 104 (a)(2).13 Petitioner's husband had been killed
7. Id. at 410-11. Boston Gas was one of the defendants.
8. Id. at 411.
9. Id. at 412.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 100 T.C. 124 (1993) (reviewed by the court).
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when the truck he was driving was struck by a railroad locomotive. As
administratrix of his estate, his widow filed a wrongful death action and a
jury verdict was returned in her favor.14 The jury award of $1,500,000,
later reduced to $995,000, was appealed and affirmed. Although the
amount of the jury award was changed after trial, the reduction was due
to the deceased's contributory negligence and to offset for an amount
previously paid by another defendant. The entire award so reduced, plus
costs and interest was the amount eventually collected. As provided by a
Michigan statute, the interest included was calculated from the com-
mencement of the action until the date the judgment was satisfied.
Petitioners did not include any part of the amount received in gross
income. The Commissioner determined that a deficiency was present,
and stated that the interest portion of the award should be included in
gross income. 15 The court held "that the statutory 'interest' received by
petitioners is not excludable as 'damages received *** on account of
personal injuries' within the meaning of section 104 (a)(2)."16
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Petitioners argued that the interest they received is excludable from
gross income by § 104 (a)(2) as part of "damages received . . . on
account of personal injuries . . . ." Petitioners took the position that
damages "should be construed expansively so as to include interest on
such damages." 17 The court declined to read the term "damages"
expansively, and instead followed the general principles that exclusions
from income should be construed narrowly and that words in a statute
should be given their ordinary meaning. 18 "In ordinary parlance,
interest requires a principal sum. In the instant case, the damages are the
principal sum on which the interest is owed, and ordinary usage suggests
the two are separate." 19 The court pointed to its recent decision in
Aames v. Commissioner,20 in which it held that interest was not ex-
cludable damages under § 104 (a)(2).2 1 It also relied on the Board of
14. Kovacs v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 124, 125 (1993).
15. Id. at 126.
16. Id. at 130. The Tax Court was split, 14 to 5, in the Kovacs decision. Twelve Tax Court
Judges (Hamblen, Parker, Shields, Cohen, Clapp, Swift, Gerber, Wright, Parr, Wells, Chiechi, and
Laro) agreed with the majority opinion written by Judge Ruwe. Judge Jacobs concurred in the result,
but not in the opinion. Two of the dissenters wrote separate opinions, each joined by one of his
colleagues. Judge Chabot dissented, but did not join in any opinion. Id. at 134.
17. Id. at 127-28.
18. Id. at 128.
19. Id. at 128-29.
20. 94 T.C. 189 (1990).
21. Aames v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 189, 193 (1990).
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Tax Appeals decision in Riddle v. Commissioner, 22 "which concerned
the excludability of damages and interest awarded thereon in connection
with personal injuries sustained during the sinking of the steamship
Lusitania." 23 In Riddle, the Board held that interest was not a part of
damages. 24 The court concluded that the interest received here was not
excludable damages.
The Tax Court also found the law of the State of Michigan to be
consistent with its characterization of the award collected by
petitioners. 25  It stated that the suit was brought under M.C.L. §
600.2922, the Michigan Wrongful Death Act and listed the types of
damages available under the Act. The list did not mention interest. The
court noted that the interest component was received pursuant to M.C.L.
§ 600.6013, a separate statute under which "interest is calculated on and
added to the judgement . *..."26 The court also pointed out that
Michigan case law was consistent with its characterization of the amounts
received by petitioners. 27
In addition, the court dealt with the petitioners' position that the
Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 198228 supported their argument
that the entire award was excluded by § 104 (a)(2). The Act amended §
104 (a)(2) by removing the phrase "whether by suit or agreement," and
replacing it with "whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments." The court interpreted the petitioners
argument to mean "that since the amount of future periodic payments
would normally be determined by taking into consideration the time
value of money, it would be inconsistent to exclude the entire amount of
such periodic payments while taxing petitioners on the 'interest' that
they received." 29 The court read the Act as dealing with "periodic
payments," which petitioners in this case were not receiving and thus
found nothing in the amendment to help them. It recognized a "poten-
tial theoretical inconsistency that might arise between taxing statutorily
imposed 'interest' while excluding 'periodic payments' of damages,
some of which may be attributable to the time value of money . . .," but
considered the problem to be within the domain of Congress and left it
to the legislature to resolve.30 The court indicated that the Act was not
22. 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1933).
23. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 129.
24. Riddle v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1339, 1341 (1933).
25. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 130.
26. Id. at 131.
27. See id. at 130-31.
28. Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 101, 96 Stat. 2605.
29. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 132.
30. Id. at 133.
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intended to change the law but to codify the existing law that "dam-
ages" received in "periodic payments" are not gross income.3 1
B. JUDGE HALPERN'S DISSENT
Judge Halpern dissented in an opinion agreed to by Judge Whalen.
Judge Halpern disagreed with the majority interpretation of the amend-
ment made by the Periodic Payment Settlement Act of 1982. Judge
Halpern did not interpret the Act as being limited to periodic payments:
The legislative history of the 1982 amendment makes it
crystal clear that the exclusion for periodic payments of
damages on account of personal injuries is not limited to the
present value of such periodic payments. Periodic payments
-in their entirety-are excludable from gross income under
section 104 (a)(2) as damages received on account of personal
injuries. No allocation is allowed for that portion of such
payments that represents consideration for the use of money
over time, i.e., interest. I would hold that lump-sum payments,
including any interest component, likewise are fully excludable
under section 104 (a)(2) as damages received on account of
personal injuries.32
In addition to concluding that the time value of money, interest, is
to be disregarded with reference to periodic payments, Judge Halpem
also read the Act as requiring no different result with reference to lump
sum payments. "As stated earlier, the language of the 1982 amendment
supports that conclusion: 'whether as lump sums or as periodic pay-
ments' suggests that Congress intended to disregard any difference
between the two methods of payment." 33
Judge Halpern also discussed Judge Beghe's dissenting opinion.
Although he agreed with Judge Beghe's decision to the extent that it
would exclude all of the award in this case based on the 1982 amend-
ment, he disagreed "with [Judge Beghe's] conclusion that the sole
condition for exclusion of a receipt under section 104 (a)(2) is that the
amount received (here prejudgment interest) constitutes 'damages'
within the meaning of that section." 34 However, he would agree that the
interest in this situation constitutes damages for purposes of § 104
(a)(2).35
31. Id. at 133-34.
32. Id. at 134 (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 136.
34. Id. at 138.
35. Id. at 139.
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C. JUDGE BEGHE'S DISSENT
Judge Beghe dissented in an opinion agreed to by Judge Colvin.
Judge Beghe indicated that he would treat statutory prejudgment interest
as part of damages received on account of personal injuries excluded
from gross income by § 104 (a)(2). 36 Judge Beghe drew a distinction
between prejudgment and postjudgment interest:37
Although a time value of money element inheres in both
prejudgment and postjudgment interest, there is a long history
of legal precedent that treats prejudgment interest on an
unliquidated claim as part of the damages received on account
of the injury that gave rise to the claim and the resulting right
to receive such damages, whereas postjudgment interest is
considered interest eo nomine ('by that name'), because it
accrues on an indebtedness that has been fixed by final court
order.38
Judge Beghe argued that the determination of the proper income
tax character of an amount should be based on more than the conclusion
that it is denominated interest. 39 He pointed to recent cases that look
beyond the initial characterization of an item in determining the
appropriate income tax character.40
Judge Beghe also pointed to the regulation issued under § 104
(a)(2), 41 and United States v. Burke,42 the recent Supreme Court decision
that applied the rule. He found that the:
regulation covers all amounts received and does not distinguish
among the component parts of an award received by a plaintiff
in a tort action . . . . Instead, the regulation focuses on the
nature of the underlying claim. Once it is found that the
personal injury claim is tort or tortlike, all amounts received
from the defendant and its insurer through the prosecution of
the claim are excluded from gross income.43
Judge Beghe concluded that "this Court should be not bound by
the 'tyranny of labels' to assume that an amount labeled 'interest' must
be treated as interest income for tax purposes when it is received through
36. Id. at 140.
37. Id. at 141.
38. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 143.
40. See id. at 144-46.
41. Id. at 146.
42. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
43. Kovacs, 100 T.C. at 146.
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the prosecution (or settlement) of a tort or tortlike claim for personal
injuries." 44
Judge Beghe also disagreed with the majority concerning the
application of Michigan law. He indicated that the Michigan Wrongful
Death Act lists elements of damages "that the damage award must
include . . ., "45 but that it "also provides that 'the court or jury may
award damages as the court or jury shall consider fair and equitable."46
Thus, he found that "[tihere is nothing in subsection 6 of the Michigan
Wrongful Death Act that prohibits a Michigan court or jury from
including an interest (time value of money) element in its verdict, so
long as it's 'fair and equitable."' 47 The fact that the interest was calcu-
lated under the general statute providing for interest on damages is not
controlling:
All this means is that the Michigan legislature, for the sake of
efficiency and convenience, enacted one interest provision
rather than a series of different provisions for the many differ-
ent types of civil actions. The fact that there is one interest
provision and that it is separate does not mean that prejudg-
ment interest cannot be a form of damages and that the interest
element in a personal injury claim is not damages on account
of personal injuries for Federal income tax purposes.4 8
Judge Beghe also stated that exclusion of the award here is support-
ed by congressional intent. He pointed out that exclusion of the interest
portion of this award is consistent with the 1982 Amendment to § 104
(a)(2). "If Congress had intended to bifurcate personal injury damage
awards into taxable and nontaxable components, it would not have
specifically excluded from gross income the interest element of the
periodic payments under structured settlements." 49
He mentions McShane as an example of a situation where "victims
of personal injury who settle their claims may exclude from gross
income amounts that the parties take account of as interest yet character-
ize as damages in their settlement agreement." 50 This leads him to the
determination that there should not be a different tax treatment if interest
44. Id. at 147 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 148.
46. Id. (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 148-49.
48. Id. at 149-50.
49. Id. at 152.
50. Id.
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is disregarded in a personal injury settlement, as opposed to a situation
where interest is stated and taxed when received after final judgment. 51
Judge Beghe also differs with the court's application of the general
rules of statutory construction:
The majority argue that reading section 104 (a)(2) to exclude
interest on damages is contrary to the maxim that exclusions
from gross income are to be narrowly construed. However, I
read the statute consistently with its broad and sweeping
exception that 'any damages' received on account of personal
injuries are not included in gross income.52
He indicates that the court's reliance on the Board of Tax Appeals
decision in Riddle is misplaced. "Riddle does not stand for the proposi-
tion that prejudgment interest is not excludable from gross income
under section 104 (a)(2), but only that postjudgment interest must be
included in gross income." 53 After a review of the authorities, Judge
Beghe concludes that "mandatory statutory prejudgment interest on
damages received in a tort or tortlike action for wrongful death . . ." is
part of the damages excluded from gross income by § 104 (a)(2).54
D. Tim COURT OF APPEALS-AFFIRMED
In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's ruling in Kovacs.55 The court ack-
nowledged that the Tax Court was split on its decision but stated "[alfter
careful study of the record and of the opinions of the Tax Court in this
case, we conclude that the majority opinion correctly analyzes the legal
issues and reaches the proper decision on the narrow question
presented." 56
III. BRABSON V. UNITED STATES-THE OTHER VIEW
In Brabson v. United States, the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado came to the conclusion that statutory prejudgment
interest is an element of damages excluded from gross income. 57 Mary
Brabson and her children were injured when an explosion, linked to a
gas leak, damaged her home. The suit in state court resulted in a jury
51. Id.
52. Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 154.
54. Id. at 158.
55. Kovacs v. Commissioner, No. 93-1637, 1994 WL 253035 (6th Cir. June 9, 1994) cert. denied,
513 U.S. 963 (1994).
56. Id. at **2.
57. 859 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Colo. 1994).
1999]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
verdict in their favor. The trial court signed a judgment awarding
specific amounts for personal injuries, property damage, and
prejudgment interest "from the date of the explosion to the date of the
judgement."58 The defendants appealed but the state courts upheld the
trial court's judgement. The plaintiffs collected damages including
"$370,723.12 . . . attributed to mandatory statutory prejudgment
interest on the personal injury award." 59 The plaintiffs did not include
the prejudgment interest in gross income on their federal income tax
returns, asserting that it was excluded by § 104 (a)(2) as damages
received on account of personal injuries. The Commissioner determined
that the returns contained deficiencies, including the interest in the
Brabsons' gross income. The Brabsons paid the difference and sued to
recover for the alleged overpaid income tax.60
A. THE DISTRICT COURT-INTEREST IS AN ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
The court began by noting that although all income from whatever
source derived is included in gross income, tort damages received on
account of personal injuries are excluded. This exclusion has been part
of the income tax statute since 1918.61 The court quoted from the
Treasury Regulation definition of damages: "An amount received . . .
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type
rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such
prosecution." 62 The court pointed out that this exclusion is equally as
broad as other exclusions from gross income under § 104, and observed
that the exclusions sometimes cover amounts that would otherwise be
part of income subject to tax. 63 The court indicated that the Tenth
Circuit, in its decision in Wulf v. City of Wichita,64 has recognized that
the § 104 (a)(2) exclusion is broad and encompasses amounts which
would otherwise be taxable: 65
Applying this analysis to the case before me, I first look to
the nature of the underlying claim. There is no dispute the
Brabsons' suit . . . was a legal action based upon tort. Nor is
there a dispute that the prejudgment interest at issue was part of
the 'amount received' by the Brabsons through prosecution of
that action.
58. Brabson v. United States, 859 F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Colo. 1994).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1361-62.
62. Id. at 1362 (quoting 26 C.F.R. 1.104-1(c) (1991)) (alteration in original).
63. Id. at 1362.
64. 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1989).
65. Brabson, 859 F.Supp. at 1363.
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This alone should be the end of the inquiry.66
The court then turned to the government's argument that the
interest was not considered "'damages' as contemplated in § 104
(a)(2)." 67 Because it found no controlling definition in the Internal
Revenue Code, the court examined how Colorado personal injury law
characterizes prejudgment interest. 68 The court "look[ed] to Colorado
caselaw . . . to determine whether prejudgment interest is an element of
damages for personal injury, rather than rely on the fact it is called
'interest."' 69 Prejudgment interest was determined to be an element of
compensdtory damages and was not considered conventional interest:
The difference between prejudgment . . . interest and
conventional interest is fundamental. The obligation to pay
prejudgment interest is tied inextricably to the concept of fault.
Before liability is fixed, prejudgment interest is part of
plaintiff's damage demand on a contingent and unliquidated
claim and accrues until judgment enters against the defendant.
Once defendant's liability in tort is fixed, his liability for the
lost time-value of plaintiff's award also becomes fixed.
Prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate for this loss and
becomes a 'part' of plaintiff's lump-sum damages ....
The Court went on to state that:
The obligation to pay postjudgment interest, by contrast, is
not directly tied to the concept of fault. Like conventional
interest, postjudgment interest accrues on a fixed indebtedness.
It compensates a judgment creditor for the debtor's use, or the
creditor's forbearance in demanding payment of an amount
fixed and owed by the debtor. It is the equivalent of 'rent' for
the use of funds due and owing to the plaintiff. Prejudgment
interest does not fit into these definitions of interest because at
the time it accrues, plaintiff is not a creditor and there is no
debt fixed or owed by the defendant to him. Plaintiff can
neither demand, nor forbear from demanding payment. 70
The court dismissed as unpersuasive the government's argument
based on Aames v. Commissioner. It pointed out that although "not
entirely clear, the Aames opinion upon which the United States relies
appears to concern the excludability under § 104 (a)(2) of postjudg-
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1364.
70. Id. at 1364-65 (footnote and citations omitted).
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ment, rather than prejudgment, interest." 71 The court asserted that the
cases cited in Aames did not concern personal injury damages and
concluded that "the Aames's analysis [was] unenlightening and undeter-
minative of the question before [it]."72
The District Court recognized that its decision was contrary to the
Tax Court's Kovacs v. Commissioner decision, but stated that "[b]ecause
[a] contrary conclusion requires neither a broadening of the term
'damages' nor the overruling of pre-Kovacs opinions, [we] decline to
follow the Kovacs majority and adopt instead the analysis of Judge
Beghe in dissent." 73 The court noted that the Tax Court majority
"relies heavily on the 1933 Board of Tax Appeals decision in Riddle v.
Commissioner."74 It pointed out that the question in Riddle concerned
postjudgment interest rather than prejudgment interest, and thus it
"simply does not support the Kovacs majority's conclusion that prejudg-
ment interest is includable in income." 75
The court also differed with the Kovacs majority in its decision that
prejudgment interest cannot be damages because it is interest. It stated
that one must look behind the label to determine if something called
interest is in reality interest. "The Kovacs majority, however, engaged in
no such analysis. Had it done so, it would have concluded mandatory
statutory prejudgment interest . . . is not 'interest' for income tax
purposes." 76
The final area examined by the court was the Periodic Payment
Settlement Act of 1982. The District Court disagreed with the Tax Court
majority in Kovacs and agreed with the analysis of both Judge Beghe
and Judge Halpern, that the time value of money is disregarded and the
entire amount of damages received is excluded from gross income as
damages .77
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS-REVERSED
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District
Court. 78 The court first pointed out the competing Internal Revenue
Code provisions, including the § 61 (a) inclusion requirement and the
opposing exclusion provided by § 104 (a)(2). It is worth noting that, at
the outset of its analysis, the court mentioned the recent Supreme Court
71. Id. at 1365.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id. at 1367 (citation omitted).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1369.
77. Id.
78. Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 607 (1996).
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decision, Commissioner v. Schleier,79 and pointed out that "[i]n interpret-
ing the breadth of § 104 (a)(2), we are guided by the corollary to § 61
(a)'s broad construction, the 'default rule of statutory interpretation that
exclusions from income must be narrowly construed."' 80
The court first looked to the Tax Court's Kovacs holding that
prejudgment interest is included in gross income and is not excluded
damages. It noted that "[tihe Tax Court's subsequent decisions, relying
on Kovacs, consistently have held that prejudgment interest is taxable,
regardless of how the state characterizes its prejudgment statute or
whether the final disposition is judgment or settlement." 8 1 It then
looked to the District Court's decision, noting that it disputed the Kovacs
reasoning, and "undertook a thorough analysis of the concept of
interest and damages and arrived at a contrary conclusion." 82 Seeing
"merit in each position" 83 it turned to its own analysis.
The court began with Schleier which firmly established the two
independent requirements for exclusion from gross income under § 104
(a)(2). "First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying cause
of action giving rise to the recovery is 'based upon tort or tort type
rights'; and second, the taxpayer must show that the damages were
received 'on account of personal injuries or sickness."' 8 4 Clearly, the
Brabsons received the prejudgment interest based on a tort satisfying the
first requirement but, the court adds, "they must demonstrate that the
interest here is 'damages,' and further, that recovery of such 'damages'
was 'on account of injuries'(i.e., attributable to the injuries suffered in
the explosion."' 85 Although looking to state law to determine "the
nature of the legal interests and rights created by state law, [the court
pointed out] that the federal tax consequences pertaining to such inter-
ests and rights are solely a matter of federal law." 86 The court's review
of Colorado law led it to conclude that "the nature of the prejudgment
interest is to compensate the injured victim for the lost time value of
money. [But,] while Colorado has characterized this compensation as an
element of damages, the taxability of this interest is purely a question of
federal law." 87 The court came to the conclusion that prejudgment
interest is compensation for the lost time value of money, and in Colo-
79. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
80. Brabson, 73 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 328 (1995)).
81. Id. at 1042-43 (citations omitted).
82. Id. at 1043.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1043 (quoting Schleier, 515 U.S. at 336).
85. Id. at 1044.
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id.
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rado, it is an element of damages which gives rise to the question of
whether such compensation is excludable under § 104 (a)(2).
The court then explored the language of the federal statute itself
and did not find it particularly helpful. Although the Brabsons had
argued that the term "damages" was broadened by the term "any," the
court concluded that:
[t]he word 'any,' however, cannot alter the meaning of 'dam-
ages,' and it therefore sheds no light on the issue at hand:
whether prejudgment interest is 'damages ...on account of
personal injury.'
Nor do we find compelling the Tax Court's approach to
the language, which is simply to rely on the fact that interest
and damages as generally understood and defined were
separate concepts. 88
The court ultimately found that the regulation issued "under § 104
(a)(2) is likewise unhelpful." 89
The court's examination of the legislative history was not especially
useful. "[It] is bereft of any direct evidence that Congress ever consid-
ered the tax treatment of prejudgment interest." 90 In a footnote to this
statement, the court dismissed the argument that the Periodic Payment
Settlement Act of 1982, which it read as applying to periodic payments
only, indicates congressional intent that the time value of money,
prejudgment interest, is excluded from gross income by § 104 (a)(2). 91
The court then looked to whether prejudgment interest was a
traditional tort remedy and found that it was not. The damages available
at the time the predecessor of § 104 (a)(2) was enacted were considered
significant by the court because they are the ones Congress could have
envisioned as being excluded. "It is only more recently, pursuant to
certain statutes, that prejudgment interest has become recoverable in
personal injury suits on nonpecuniary harms." 92 The court did not want
to read the § 104 (a)(2) exclusion broadly without an indication of
congressional intent to do so.93
The court looked again to the Supreme Court's Schleier decision
and its requirement that a direct link should exist between the injury and
the relief. "[C]ompensation for the lost time value of money is caused
88. Id. at 1045 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1045 n.5.
92. Id. at 1046.
93. Id.
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by the delay in attaining judgment. Time becomes the relevant factor,
not the injury itself . . . . [T]he award of prejudgment interest is not
linked to the injury in the same direct way as traditional tort
remedies." 94 In summary, the court stated:
We believe that the Taxpayers' construction, although not
irrational, contemplates too broad a reading of the exclusion
provision, a step we are unwilling to take. The default rule to
construe exclusions narrowly, the nature of prejudgment
interest, the Court's recent decision in Schleier, and the pur-
pose of § 104 (a)(2) as we discern it, all lead us to conclude
that the prejudgment interest recovered by Taxpayers does not
constitute 'damages on account of personal injury' under §
104 (a)(2). 95
IV. THE TAX COURT FOLLOWS KOVACS
The Tax Court has followed its Kovacs decision in subsequent cases.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit pointed this out in its Brab-
son opinion. 96 Some of the Tax Court decisions have been reviewed on
appeal.
A. DELANEY V. COMMISSIONER
1. The Tax Court
Delaney v. Commissioner97 presented the Tax Court with another
case involving prejudgment interest. Delaney "was injured when the
railing on the deck of his condominium collapsed. Petitioner tumbled to
the ground and broke his back as a result of the fall."9 8 He commenced
a lawsuit in state court against the developer, the condominium
association and its management firm. After trial, the jury "returned a
verdict in favor of petitioner . . . in the amount of $287,000, consisting
of $175,000 in damages and $112,000 in statutory interest under R.I.
Gen. Laws Section 9-21-10 (1985)."99 The defendants appealed and
while the appeal was pending, settlement negotiations commenced.100 A
settlement was reached which provided for a payment of $250,000 to
petitioner, and the parties "entered into a stipulation which stated in
94. Id. at 1047.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See id. at 1042-43.
97. 70T.C.M. (CCH) 353 (1995).
98. Delaney v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 353, 354 (1995).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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pertinent part: Plaintiffs' claims against [defendants] are hereby
dismissed with prejudice. No interest. No costs." 101 The Tax Court
indicated that "[t]he parties to the stipulation did not consider the tax
consequences of such a stipulation."] 02
The petitioners did not include any part of the settlement in their
gross income. 103 The Commissioner "determined a deficiency in
petitioners' Federal income tax . . . based on the inclusion of 39 percent
of the settlement proceeds (or $97,561) as prejudgment interest. The 39
percent figure was based on the fact that thirty-nine percent (or
$112,000) of the original award made by the jury was prejudgment
interest."104 Arguing that the entire $250,000 was damages received on
account of personal injuries, the petitioners excluded the entire amount
from gross income. Although willing to admit that a portion of the
settlement amount is excluded by § 104 (a)(2), the Commissioner
"[asserts] that the settlement agreement does not contain any specific
allocations regarding interest. Additionally, [Commissioner] contends
that because the original judgment included statutory prejudgment
interest in the amount of $112,000, the portion of the proceeds received
in lieu of such interest is not excludable under section 104 (a)(2)."105
After mentioning the competing Code sections, the Tax Court stated that
"[s]tatutory interest imposed on tort judgments, however, must be
included in gross income under section 61(a)(4) even under circum-
stances in which the underlying damages are excludable under Section
104 (a)(2)."1 06 The court relied on its Kovacs decision as authority for
this statement.
The court then discussed the allocation of the proceeds of the
settlement agreement noting that "express allocations in a settlement
agreement will be respected to the extent that the agreement is entered
into by the parties at arm's length and in good faith."107 The petition-
ers asserted that the allocation should be governed by McShane, "in
which [the Tax Court] held that none of the settlement proceeds received
by the taxpayers were includable in gross income as interest, taking into
account express language in a settlement agreement."108 After examin-
ing the facts of petitioners' case, the court came to a contrary conclu-
sion:
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 355.
106. Id. (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Although the stipulation expressly provided that the settlement
amount did not include interest, the record in the instant case,
unlike McShane, is devoid of evidence that such provision of
the stipulation was the product of arm's-length negotiations
between the parties. The only evidence in the record is that the
parties did not discuss the tax implications of such aspect of the
stipulation. Accordingly, we conclude that petitioners have
failed to establish that there was no interest component to the
settlement. 109
2. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
decision.110 The court first looked to whether the Tax Court had proper-
ly characterized part of the lump sum received by the Delaneys as
prejudgment interest. 111 The court began by examining the language
used in the settlement and the stipulation of dismissal.11 2 It also pointed
out the general rule that "taxpayers bear the burden of proving that a
tax deficiency assessment is erroneous." 11 3 The court set out the
approach to be taken. Although recognizing "the importance of the
terms employed in the stipulation of dismissal, [the Court of Appeals
noted that] the Tax court appropriately inquired, inter alia, whether a
portion of the settlement amount represented prejudgment interest, by
looking beyond the language utilized by the parties." 1l4
The language itself, "[n]o Interest. [n]o costs," could lead to the
conclusion that no prejudgment interest was included in the settlement
amount. In this situation, however, "confronted with a $250,000
postjudgment settlement literally allocating nothing to statutory prejudg-
ment interest, notwithstanding the $112,000 prejudgment interest com-
ponent concededly included in the $287,000 superior court judgment,
the Tax Court reasonably considered, inter alia, the intent of the parties
in context." 115 The court mentioned that in the context presented in this
case, "[n]o interest" is ambiguous and could mean no postjudgment
interest.11 6 The court distinguished the case from McShane, where the
"without costs and interest" language was included at the insistence of
109. Id. at 356.
110. Delaney v. Commissioner, 99 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996).
111. Id. at 23.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing United States v. Rexash, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1973)).
114. Id. at 24.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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defendant's counsel, and where the Tax Court relied on "the testimony
of all counsel in the tort action that the settlement amounts for each
plaintiff had been arrived at by assessing the risks on appeal and that tax
consequences had never been discussed.""l 7 The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit found the Tax Court here to have:
pursued a similarly inclusive approach by probing beyond the
settlement agreement terms, examining all relevant evidence
including the testimony of the Delaneys' counsel in the
underlying tort action, who stated that the excludability of the
$250,000 settlement amount from gross income was never
taken into account in the settlement agreement, only the risks
on appeal. 18
In upholding the Tax Court's conclusion, the court also noted that
in the case before it "[t]here was no testimonial evidence regarding the
relevant intentions of any tort-action defendant."119
Concerning the allocation of part of the settlement to interest, "the
Tax Court supportably ruled that the Delaneys had not overcome the
presumption of correctness to which the Commissioner's allocation is
entitled, [therefore] the allocation of 39% of the settlement amount to
statutory prejudgment interest, . . .did not constitute error." 120 Al-
though affirming the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals specifically
declined to resolve the question of the excludability of prejudgment
interest as an element of damages received on account of personal
injuries. First the court refused to review the Kovacs:
holding that the prejudgment interest component in a
compensatory damages recovery for personal injuries is
taxable. The Delaneys maintain that Kovacs is unsound
because it relied upon judicial precedents for taxing
postjudgment interest as authority for taxing prejudgment
interest. Consequently, they contend, Kovacs progeny such as
Delaney are similarly flawed. As their argument is raised for
the first time on appeal, we decline to address it.121
Next the court looked to the characterization of prejudgment
interest as an element of damages received on account of personal
injuries.122 It followed the approach of the Tenth Circuit in Brabson to
"first ascertain the pertinent characteristics of statutory prejudgment
117. Id. at 25.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 25-26.
121. Id. at 26.
122. Id.
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* interest under [state] law, but then look to federal law to determine its
excludability."' 123 The court determined that "statutory prejudgment
interest is not an element of damages in a personal injury action under
Rhode Island law .... [Thus] the Delaneys must establish that prejudg-
ment interest is excludable under Section 104 (a)(2) notwithstanding its
state-law characterization."1 24 Here the court looked to the second
prong of the Schleier test to find if the damages were received on
account of the personal injuries:
The Delaneys utterly failed to preserve any claim that the
prejudgment interest component in their settlement recovery
was linked to their personal injuries. As it is neither necessary
nor practicable to do so in this case, . . . we do not consider
whether statutory prejudgment interest may ever be excludable
from gross income under § 104 (a)(2), an important question
left for another day.125
B. FOREST V. COMMISSIONER
1. The Tax Court
Decided the same day as Delaney, another case involving prejudg-
ment interest is Forest v. Commissioner.126 Petitioner "fractured her
back when she slipped and fell inside her employer's walk-in refrigera-
tor, manufactured by Bohn Refrigeration Products (Bohn). [The] peti-
tioner commenced a products liability action against Bohn in the
Superior Court of Rhode Island ... ,"127 After trial "the jury returned
a verdict in favor of petitioner against Bohn in the amount of $2,340,000
($2,600,000 less ten percent contributory negligence of $260,000).
Under [state law] petitioner was also entitled to statutory prejudgment
interest in the amount of $2,667,600, resulting in a total judgment in the
amount of $5,007,600."128 Defendant requested a new trial and after a
hearing:
the Superior Court found that the jury's award 'shocked the
conscience' and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages,
provided petitioner did not agree to a remittitur of $1,000,000
... . [Pletitioner consented to the $1,000,000 remittitur. Fol-
lowing petitioner's filing of the remittitur . .. the Superior
123. Id.
124. Id. at 26-27.
125. Id. at 27 (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
126. 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 349 (1995).
127. Forest v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 349, 350 (1995).
128. Id.
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Court entered a judgment for the petitioner against Bohn in the
amount of $1,440,000, plus interest and costs. Under [state
law] the Clerk of the Court added to the $1,440,000 judgment
an additional $1,641,600, representing statutory prejudgment
interest, which resulted in a total judgment against Bohn in the
amount of $3,081,600.129
The defendant appealed the judgment and while the appeal was
pending the parties agreed to a settlement of $2,000,000 in exchange for
a general release:130
In the general release, petitioner and Bohn did not allocate any
portion of the $2 million settlement proceeds to either the
damage award or prejudgment interest. During the settlement
negotiations, the parties neither discussed whether any portion
of the settlement proceeds should be allocated to interest nor
stated that none of the settlement proceeds represented
interest.1 31
A Satisfaction Stipulation stating that "The judgment entered ... in
the amount of $1,440,000, plus interest and costs, has been fully satis-
fied," was signed by attorneys and the $2,000,000 was paid.132 Petition-
er did not report any part of the settlement in her gross income. 133 As a
result, the Commissioner determined a deficiency contending that
$560,000 in interest income should have been included. 134 The
$560,000 was calculated by deducting $1,440,000, the "original damage
award" from the $2,000,000 settlement proceeds.135
The petitioner argued that the entire settlement was excluded from
gross income by section "104 (a)(2) because it was a lump sum that was
paid to' petitioner to compensate for her personal injuries."1 36 The
Commissioner "however, contends that because the original judgment
included statutory prejudgment interest, the portion of the proceeds
received in lieu of such interest is not excludable under section 104
(a)(2)."137 The Tax Court began by pointing out that the Commission-
er's "determination in the notice of deficiency is presumptively correct,
and petitioner has the burden of proving that no part of the amounts
received constituted interest." 13 8  It also reiterated the rule that
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 351.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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"[s]tatutory interest imposed on tort judgments, . . . must be included in
gross income under section 61 (a)(4), even under circumstances in which
the underlying damages are excludable under section 104 (a)(2)."1 39
Kovacs is cited as authority for the rule.
The court then turned to the allocation of the settlement agreement
proceeds. It pointed out that express allocations in a settlement agree-
ment are the "most important factor in deciding whether a payment was
made on account of a tortious personal injury for purposes of the
exclusion under section 104 (a)(2)." 140 The court also noted that "we
are not required to respect the express allocations unless we are con-
vinced that they were negotiated at arm's length between adverse
parties."141 The petitioner, citing McShane, asserted "that the absence
of any language in the general release is equivalent to an express alloca-
tion of all of the settlement proceeds to personal injury damages."1 42
However, the court agreed with the Commissioner's determination "that
McShane is distinguishable because the instant case does not involve an
express allocation that the settlement proceeds did not include
interest." 143 Finding no allocation of, nor even any mention of, interest
in the general release, the court turned to other evidence in the record.
In its review of the facts, the Tax Court noted that the amount of the
jury verdict as originally returned as well as after reduction by the trial
court, had statutory prejudgment interest added in reaching the total
judgment.144 It also pointed out that the Satisfaction Stipulation stated
that "[t]he judgment entered . . . plus interest and costs, has been fully
satisfied."145 Thus, it concluded that "[b]ased on the facts and circum-
stances of the instant case .... the petitioner has failed to establish that
none of the settlement proceeds were paid on account of prejudgment
statutory interest." 146
Having found that prejudgment interest was included in the settle-
ment amount, the court then determined what part of the lump sum was
interest. "[B]ecause 53.3 percent of the original judgment ... constitut-
ed prejudgment statutory interest, [the Tax Court was willing to find that]
53.3 percent of the settlement proceeds . . . should be allocated to
interest." 147 However, because the amount set forth in the Commission-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 352.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 353.
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er's notice of deficiency was less than the amount found by that calcula-
tion, the court sustained the lesser amount. 148
2. The Court of Appeals
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court. 149 The court first examined the question
of whether any of the settlement proceeds received by the taxpayer
constituted "prejudgment interest and, if so, whether it was excludable as
'damages received . . . on account of personal injuries' within the
meaning of Section 104 (a)(2)."150
The court pointed out the general rule that the taxpayer has the
burden of proving that a deficiency is in error citing its own recent
Delaney decision.] 51
In noting the silence on the matter of interest in the general release,
the court determined that it had to look to more than simply the lan-
guage of the agreement. The Court of Appeals approved of the Tax
Court's review in that it:
looked beyond the language of the General Release to the facts
and circumstances surrounding that settlement. The Tax Court
considered evidence from Taxpayer's attorneys that the tax
consequences of the settlement were not contemplated during
the settlement negotiations. The Tax Court also recognized,
however, that the settlement was negotiated under the shadow
of a judgment that provided prejudgment interest, in the same
percentage of the total award both before and after the
remittitur. Regardless of which judgment is considered, the
Tax Court was not clearly erroneous in considering this circum-
stance as part of the context in which the settlement was
reached. 152
The court saw the Settlement Stipulation as indicating "that the
settlement reached reflected satisfaction of the jury award, [$1,440,000,
plus interest] as that award had been apportioned by the Superior
Court."153 Overall, the court did not find the Tax Court's conclusion to
be clearly erroneous. 154
148. Id.
149. Forest v. Commissioner, No. 95-2180, 1996 WL 728328 (1st Cir. Dec. 18, 1996).
150. Id. at **3.
151. Id. at **4.
152. Id. (footnotes omitted).
153. Id. at **5.
154. Id.
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The court also reviewed the taxpayers' contention that McShane
should control. It distinguished McShane noting that in the instant case
the Tax Court:
heard no evidence as to the intent of the payor, Bohn. The
[Tax C]ourt found that, unlike the agreement in McShane,
there was no express statement in the Release indicating that the
payment was not to include prejudgment interest. Finally, the
Stipulation contained language indicating that the settlement
satisfied the judgment after remittitur, including interest and
costs. 155
After determining that the settlement included prejudgment interest,
the Court of Appeals turned to the question of its excludability from
gross income.
The "Taxpayer argue[d] that the Code, legislative history and prior
case law do not support the Tax Court's holding in Kovacs v. Commis-
sioner, that prejudgment interest on a personal injury claim is not ex-
cludable from gross income under Section 104 (a)(2)."1 56 However, the
court would not decide the question where the arguments were raised for
the first time on appeal. "As we find nothing in the record below,
including the testimony presented and the initial and reply briefs of the
parties, to indicate that these arguments were raised before the Tax Court,
we decline the Taxpayer's invitation to consider them for the first time
on appeal."1 57
The taxpayer also argued that "under Rhode Island law, statutorily
imposed interest is considered part of damages meant to compensate the
injured party and thus is excludable."' 158 Relying on its recent Delaney
decision, the court found that under Rhode Island law prejudgment
interest is not considered damages.159
Finally the Taxpayer raised the argument that prejudgment interest
is excluded under federal law. This argument concerns the second
prong of the Supreme Court's Schleier test that determines whether the
damages were received "on account of personal injuries":
[The] taxpayer appears to argue that the purpose of the
statutorily-imposed prejudgment interest is to make her whole,
as though the injury had never occurred. This argument rests
on two statements we glean from her brief to the effect that the
interest imposed is meant to compensate the injured party for a
155. Id.
156. Id. at **6 (citation omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at **7.
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delay in the payment. Though this argument may have some
merit, we reserve the question for another day. Because [the]
Taxpayer failed to raise the contention that the statutorily-
imposed prejudgment interest is somehow related to her per-
sonal injury before the Tax Court, she has not preserved the
argument for appeal. We find that argument waived.160
V. CONCLUSION
The position of the Tax Court is that prejudgment interest is part of
gross income. This is true although the interest is collected in connec-
tion with damages excluded from gross income since they are received
in connection with personal injuries. In Kovacs, the Tax Court would
not treat such interest as damages received on account of personal
injuries. The court was unwilling to read the term damages broadly and
treated interest in terms of its conventional meaning. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit in Brabson, seeing "merit in each position,"
was willing to review Kovacs. Although upholding the Tax Court's
position, it did not think it "irrational" that interest could be damages.
However, the court was "unwilling to take" that step itself.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in both Delaney and
Forest declined to review Kovacs. In those cases it determined that the
argument concerning Kovacs was raised for the first time on appeal. In
both cases, it also deliberately did not address the significant question of
whether prejudgment interest may be sufficiently linked to a personal
injury to be excluded from gross income under § 104 (a)(2). The First
Circuit has left itself room to consider these remaining questions in the
future. In addition, other Circuit Courts of Appeal may also be present-
ed with the opportunity to examine the issues.
Rather than leaving the questions to be resolved by the courts,
Congress has the opportunity to clarify the situation. Although recogniz-
ing that the tax treatment of time value of money received by personal
injury victims may differ depending upon whether they receive a lump
sum or a structured settlement, the decision is legislative rather than
judicial.
Until there is further guidance from the courts or Congress, person-
al injury victims obtaining a settlement still have a potential tax question.
The cases reviewed show the factors examined in determining if a
settlement amount will be considered excluded damages, or if part of the
amount received will be included interest income. The problem can
160. Id. (emphasis added).
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arise if there has been a jury verdict and settlement occurs while the
appeal is pending. The allocations in a written settlement agreement are
important but not controlling. Allocations that are the result of an
arm's-length bargain are more significant. The court was particularly
concerned with the intention of the defendant making the payment in
McShane. The presence of conflicting signals in documents such as the
settlement agreement, a release, a stipulation of dismissal and/or a satisfac-
tion of judgment can cause unintended consequences and unexpected
income.

